- The Writer holds听an MSc in Eurasian Political Economy & Energy听from King鈥檚 College London and听also an听MA in European Studies from Sabanc谋 University.
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The exploration and production of hydrocarbons around the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, from Israel鈥檚 and Cyprus鈥� offshore resources, stands as major obstacle for the companies involved as Israel has not entered into any common exclusive economic zone agreements with its neighbors, other than Greek-administered Cyprus back in 2010.
In particular, natural gas discoveries at the Leviathan and Aphrodite basin off Israel鈥檚 coast have once again raised the question whether it will be legally possible to export natural gas founded in the basins of the East Mediterranean to regions where it is most needed.
Israel appears to view these discoveries as an opportunity to improve its geopolitical standing in the region by bolstering its relationship with Southern Cyprus, Turkey and with the neighboring countries. By doing so, it seems that Prime Minister Netanyahu aims to mitigate the overall risk of suspension of gas exports with any of the commercial partner countries 鈥� laying grounds to help Israel maximize its commercial gains.
Although several options are on the table as to how natural gas can be exported from Israel to the European gas market, I will evaluate the legal aspects of one of the most promising economically-viable, financially-sound options among the various alternatives -- the building of a sub-sea pipeline from Israel to Turkey. However, in the absence of a major breakthrough in the current political impasse between the Greek Cypriot administration in Cyprus and Turkey, an arduous effort would be required to proceed.
Signed in 1982, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is a major tool that governs whether the pipeline can be realized. The existing international law may not create the smoothest conditions for the pipeline鈥檚 advancement, however; articles 58 and 79 of UNCLOS provide the basis for potential investors to build a pipeline on the continental shelf without the consent of the Greek Cypriots.
Article 58/1 which regulates rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ)鈥漜learly gives a green light for companies to proceed further by stipulating, 鈥渋n the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and over flight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines,..鈥�
Pursuant to article 79/1, 鈥�All States are entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf, in accordance with the provisions of this article.鈥�
By the same token, when we look at subparagraph (2), it infers that it further strengthens the position of coastal states by stating, 鈥渟ubject to its right to take reasonable measures for the exploration of the continental shelf, the exploitation of its natural resources and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from pipelines, the coastal State may not impede the laying or maintenance of such cables or pipelines.鈥�
Although article 58 and 79 (1/2) appear to give the consent to the construction of a pipeline between Israel to Turkey via Cyprus by stipulating its legal ability to so, article 79/3, however seems to suggest quite the opposite and creates ambiguity with the other articles. 鈥�The delineation of the course for the laying of such pipelines on the continental shelf is subject to the consent of the coastal State.鈥�
Non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, Ambassador Matt Bryza states, 鈥淯NCLOS seem to grant Cyprus a right to withhold its consent for a pipeline across its continental shelf at the same time that it obligates Cyprus to permit such a pipeline.鈥�
Turkey has not yet signed the UNCLOS since its enactment into law in 1982, due to conflicting views over continental shelf rights between Turkey, Greece and Greek-administered Cyprus, detailed in articles 3, 33 and 121, which mainly refer to this dispute between the parties.
The third article regulates the breadth of the territorial sea which has been set at a limit of 12 nautical miles from shore. Likewise article 33 refers to the contiguous regulated zone which extends 24 nautical miles and lastly, article 121 refers to the continental shelf as well as EEZ of the island. Turkey remains cautious in its approach to these articles which have been on the diplomatic agenda for a long time.
Such a project, which would cost billions for investors, is doomed to failure unless political as well as legal difficulties are overcome as no investor would be willing to undertake a project with such high stakes. 听
Although other coastal states might be forced to use either the EEZ or the continental shelf of Southern Cyprus, article 79/3 insinuates the blocking of any international pipeline projects that passes through Greek-administered Cyprus鈥� EEZ, which requires the 鈥渃onsent鈥� of the coastal state.听听
To add to the existing complexity, other commercial and political factors also impede the building of either a pipeline and/or LNG terminals in the region. The political bottleneck between Turkey and southern Cyprus will likely remain a hurdle to the realization of such projects in the foreseeable future.
However, all is not lost and given the current structure of UNCLOS, another viable option which considers the requirements of all parties involved, while overcoming the legal gridlock is the 鈥渟ui-generis-agreement.鈥� This would allow for a sub-sea pipeline to be constructed between Israel and Turkey by purely agreeing on this subject matter alone without the need to resolve the other major issues between the states.
In a worst case scenario, the Greek Cypriot administration might block the project by quoting 79/3 as a reference point using reasons laid down in the UNCLOS. However, Israel could take the initiative to convince both parties to sign separate bilateral sui-generis agreements with Turkey and the Greek Cyprus administration to proceed further in the pipeline project. Israel could use its leverage over the Greek Cypriots to use their EEZ until the point where the Turkish continental shelf starts, and from that point on, another agreement could be signed between Israel and Turkey to allow the project to reach Turkey鈥檚 southern Ceyhan province.听
- Opinions expressed in this piece are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu Agency's editorial policy