The most financially sound and physically secure option for the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)鈥檚 oil and gas transportation routes to export hydrocarbons is to construct a pipeline parallel to the Khurmala-Ceyhan pipeline and equivalent to the same capacity as the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. By building a pipeline on this route, it will be a cost effective option allowing for increased volumes in the region as well as in the overall expenditure on protecting the already existing pipeline.
With this proposed pipeline, the total volume of oil would likely reach 1.5 million barrels per day (mbpd) from a volume of 800,000 mbpd, comparable to the oil capacity that passes through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. And the expense of establishing security forces would be less costly since the new pipeline would be laid near the existing pipeline. Consequently, Ankara could serve as an indispensable partner for Erbil to securely transport its gas and oil to Europe or elsewhere through Mediterranean routes, especially in comparison to other available partners.
Turkey has been a reliable partner for the KRG and has never shut down the Kirkuk Ceyhan pipeline other than during the Gulf War and when UN sanctions were imposed on Iraq鈥檚 government from 1990 to 1996. Even when the pipeline between the states was attacked or sabotaged by Daesh or any other terrorist organization, Turkey acted swiftly to repair and re-open it within a matter of days, which again serves to support the belief that Turkey still stands as the best available option for the region.
On May 8, 2014, despite Baghdad鈥檚 attempts to prevent oil and gas sales, a tanker carrying KRG鈥檚 oil embarked from the Turkish coastal town of Ceyhan, anchored in Trieste, and reached European refineries through the Transalpine pipeline.
When Turkey was given a tough time by Iraq鈥檚 Central Government for allowing the KRG to export oil through the Ceyhan pipeline, the KRG put a lot of effort in establishing an image of itself as buffer and investor-friendly for Turkey.
After the bitter and conflicting views between Turkey and the KRG started to change when the Turkish premier visited and opened the International Airport in Erbil in March 2011, this intensified relationship was a catalyst for natural gas 鈥渟urging to the center of several geopolitical tussles taking place in and around the Middle East鈥� points out Keily Miller, a research associate at the Center for the Energy Studies of James A. Baker Institute. Considering the historical mutual enmity between the parties in the region, Miller suggests that this considerable change has been suspiciously questioned as 鈥渙ne of the single most interesting shifts in today鈥檚 political climate in the transformation of Turkey鈥檚 relationship with Iraq鈥檚 Kurdistan Regional Government.鈥�
Although the Iraqi Central Government in Baghdad has attempted to prevent the sale of the KRG鈥檚 oil and gas, it seems that this approach is doomed to fail given the increasing need for energy both in the region and the world. Thanks to its abundant fossil fuel reserves, the KRG鈥檚 economy continues to expand. This will likely give the KRG administration the upper hand in extending its reach to the world鈥檚 energy markets through Turkey鈥檚 Ceyhan by benefiting from the Ceyhan hub as the best available option.
Next week the analysis will cover the prospects of KRG鈥檚 oil industry by looking at the future projections and what this means for the region and Turkey.